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Recent Cases
governing standards. The court suggested two alternative standards of
care: 1) a case-by-case basis where
juries would apply the reasonable person standard; or 2) a judicially created standard of care. The court rejected the first alternative, explaining
that this open-ended rule would compel manufacturers to package all their
nonprescription drugs with warnings
in multiple foreign languages which
would add to the costs and environmental burdens of the packaging. The
court also declined to declare a particularized standard of care since the
judiciary lacks the procedures and the
resources to make relevant inquiries.
Thus, the court concluded that the
administrative and statutory standards
provided the best standard of care.
Although it did not foreclose the
possibility of tort liability premised
upon the content of foreign-language
advertising, the court held that manufacturers do not have a duty to warn
that is broader in scope and more onerous than that currently imposed by
applicable statutes and regulations
because the associated problems and
costs would be too great. The court
adopted the FDA's position that "it is
in the best interest of the consumer,
industry, and the marketplace to have
uniformity in presentation and clarity
of message" in the warnings provided
with nonprescription drugs. The court
reasoned that to preserve this uniformity and clarity, to avoid the problems and costs of foreign-language
requirements, and to defer to the legislature, it adopted the legislative standard of care that required nonprescription drug warnings only in English.
Thus, the court held as a matter of law
that Plough was not liable for failing
to warn Ramirez in Spanish about the
dangers of Reye's syndrome.
The court also denied recovery on
the plaintiff's alternative theories.
Ramirez also argued that the labeling
was defective because it should have
warned against the use of SJAC for
children with colds. The court stated
that because the plaintiff's mother
conceded that she had not read the
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label, plaintiff's injury could not have
been caused by the labeling. In his
other theory, Ramirez also asserted
that Plough should not have distributed SJAC at all since the dangers of
Reye's syndrome outweighed any benefits of SJAC. The court, however,
rejected this theory, stating that Plough
was not liable for keeping its product
in the market when plaintiff's mother
bought it. At that time, the FDA had
not determined whether Reye's syndrome was caused by aspirin, and
therefore, the FDA had concluded that
product warnings were sufficient.
Concurrence Addresses Potential
Liability of Foreign-Language
Advertising
Justice Mosk wrote separately to
address the issue posed but not answered by the majority: the potential
liability arising from foreign-language
advertising based on tort theories of
recovery. The concurrence agreed,
however, that if a nonprescription drug
manufacturer gave reasonable notice
of possible side effects in a foreign
language to a consumer whose purchase was induced in that language,
the manufacturer would meet the standard of reasonable conduct. .Kathie Yoo

Officers and Directors of
Failed Federally
Chartered

Financial Institutions
Will Be Held to a Gross
Negligence Standard of
Liability
In Resolution Trust Corp. v.
Gallagher, 10 F.3d 416 (7th Cir.
1993), the United States Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held
that Section 1821(k) of the Financial
Institutions Reform, Recovery, and
Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA)
preempts federal common law and
establishes a gross negligence standard of liability for officers and directors of failed federally chartered financial institutions. However, the
court purposefully chose not to reach
the issue of whether Section 1821 (k)'s
gross negligence standard preempts
state law, cautioning that federalism
concerns require greater evidence of
congressional intent to preempt state
law than federal common law.
District Court Dismisses All RTC
Claims
In 1990, the Resolution Trust Corporation (RTC) placed the Concordia
Federal Bank for Savings (Concordia),
a federally chartered and insured thrift,
into receivership. On February 14,
1991, the RTC brought suit against
Concordia's former directors and officers, seeking to recover losses for
alleged negligence, breach of fiduciary duty, gross negligence, and
breach of contract. The RTC maintained that the defendants' conduct
caused Concordia to incur substantial
losses, resulting in the thrift's failure.
The defendants, under Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(b)(6), filed motions to dismiss for
failure to state a claim.
The District Court for the Northern
District of Illinois dismissed the negligence, breach of fiduciary duty, and
breach of contract claims, holding that
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Section 1821(k) preempted all previously existing federal common law
and created a federal cause of action
solely for gross negligence. However, it held that Section 1821(k) did
not preempt either state statutory or
common law. Despite this finding,
the court ruled that no state law claims
could be successfully prosecuted
against the defendants because
Concordia was a federally chartered
and regulated thrift, organized under
federal law.
Although it dismissed the RTC's
claims, the district court granted its
petition to certify for interlocutory
review the question of whether Section 1821(k) preempted federal common law and created a cause of action
solely for gross negligence. On November 30, 1992, the Seventh Circuit
agreed to hear the interlocutory appeal.

ages in any civil action by, on behalf
of, or at the request or direction of the
Corporation... for gross negligence,
including any similar conduct or conduct that demonstrates a greater disregard of a duty of care (than gross
negligence) including intentional
tortious conduct, as such terms are
defined and determined under applicable State law. Nothing in this paragraph shall impair or affect any right
of the Corporation under other applicable law.
From its reading of the statute, the
Seventh Circuit determined that Congress spoke directly to the issue in
question. Moreover, it concluded that
the plain language of Section 1821 (k)
established a gross negligence standard of liability for officers and directors of failed financial institutions,
holding that federal common law must
yield to Congress' clear statement on
the matter.

FIRREA's Plain Language
Preempts FederalCommon Law
The preemption issue as certified
was one of first impression in the
Seventh Circuit. Moreover, no other
circuit court had directly addressed
this question. A majority of district
courts, however, have held that Section 1821(k) preempts federal common law.
In its analysis, the Seventh Circuit
first recognized the limited role federal common law plays in areas where
Congress has legislated. The court
observed that federal common law
applies only in those situations where
Congress has not addressed a particular issue and there exists a significant
conflict between a federal interest and
state law. In resolving the issue of
whether Congress spoke directly to
the issue of the standard of liability
governing suits brought by the RTC
against officers and directors of failed
federally chartered financial institutions, the court turned to the plain
language of the statute. Section
1821(k) provides as follows:
A director or officer of an insured
depository institution may be held
personally liable for monetary dam-

RTC Disagrees with Court's
Analysis
The RTC disagreed with the district court's conclusion that Section
1821(k) speaks directly to the question of the standard of liability governing suits brought by it against directors and officers of failed federally
chartered financial institutions. Turning to the language of the statute, the
RTC first argued that because Section
1821(k) states an officer or director
may be held liable for gross negligence or intentional torts, instead of
may only, Congress did not intend to
displace the federal common law standard of liability.
The Seventh Circuit rejected the
RTC's reading of Section 1821 (k). It
found that "may" when read in the
context of the statute, referred to the
RTC's right to bring suit under this
section. Furthermore, the court observed that the word "may" cannot be
read to qualify the gross negligence
liability standard and thus is irrelevant to the substance of the provision.
The RTC then argued that the savings clause contained in Section
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1821(k) allows actions under federal
common law. This savings clause
specifically provides that "nothing in
this paragraph shall impair or affect
any right of the Corporation under
other applicable law."
The Seventh Circuit again rejected
the RTC's argument. It declared that
if the RTC's reading of FIRREA was
correct, the general language of the
savings clause would override the
statute's specific language establishing a gross negligence standard of
liability. Such an interpretation would
violate a fundamental principle of
statutory construction that holds the
reading of a statute should not render
any part inoperative. In addition, the
court noted that a better reading of the
savings clause was one that would
preserve the RTC's ability to take
other regulatory actions based on
simple negligence. Any other reading
would diminish its previous powers,
such as the power to remove directors
and issue "cease and desist" orders for
simple negligence.
Finally, the RTC contended that
the legislative history of Section
1821(k) failed to support preemption
of federal common law. In its argument, the RTC relied heavily on the
Senate report accompanying the statute. However, the Seventh Circuit
found the Senate report unpersuasive
as it was not available when the Senate initially voted on FIRREA. Rather,
the court turned to the conference report for more authoritative evidence
of congressional intent in drafting the
statute.
The conference report stated that
Section 1821(k) preempts state law
and permits the FDIC to pursue claims
for gross negligence or any conduct
that demonstrates a greater disregard
of a duty of care. From this reading,
the court concluded that Congress intended for officers and directors to be
held liable for gross negligence or
conduct indicating a greater disregard
of a duty of care.
Furthermore, the court noted that
key proponents of the bill supported a
higher level of liability than simple
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negligence. They recognized the need
for a higher standard of liability in
order to attract high quality officers
and directors. Moreover, the court
observed that two subsequent attempts
to modify the statute and replace the
gross negligence standard with a standard of simple negligence failed.
Taken together, the court found that
the legislative history of FIRREA is
consistent with its interpretation that
the plain language of the statute establishes a gross negligence standard
of liability for officers and directors
of failed financial institutions.
Seventh Circuit Finds Precedent
for Preemption
In further support for its holding,
the Seventh Circuit found the United
States Supreme Court's decision in
City ofMilwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S.
304 (1981) (Milwaukee II), required a
finding of preemption in the case at
bar. In Milwaukee H, the issue before
the Court was whether the Federal
Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972 preempted an existing
federal common law action for abatement of a nuisance caused by interstate water pollution. The Court held
that the 1972 amendments preempted
federal common law as Congress occupied the field, establishing a comprehensive regulatory program overseen by an expert administrative
agency. Identifying similar factors in
the instant case, the Seventh Circuit
determined that the analysis employed
in Milwaukee II was appropriate in
the current situation.
First, the court explained that
FIRREA established a comprehensive
regulatory scheme as it expanded federal authority over the activities of
officers and directors of federally insured financial institutions. For example, FIRREA broadened the power
of federal banking agencies to require
officers and directors, subject to a
"cease and desist" order, to make restitution or provide reimbursement if they
were unjustly enriched by reckless disregard for the law or regulations.
Second, the court found that
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FIRREA created several expert agencies to supervise and administer the
comprehensive regulatory scheme. In
addition, FIRREA also created the
RTC to assist failed thrift institutions.
From its analysis of the plain language of Section 1821(k), its legislative history, and the Supreme Court's
decision in Milwaukee H, the Seventh
Circuit concluded that Congress intended to preempt federal common
law and establish a gross negligence
standard of liability for officers and
directors of failed federally chartered
financial institutions. However, the
court emphasized that it chose not to
address the issue of whether Section
1821(k) preempts state law. In so
doing, it noted that federalism concerns require greater evidence of congressional intent to preempt state law
than federal common law and that a
court must start with the assumption
that federal statutory law cannot supersede a state's police power in the
absence of clear and manifest congressional intent. o-*
Joyce E. Raupp

Federal Airline
Deregulation Act Not
Preempted by State

Claims for Breach of
Contract
In Wolens v. American Airlines,
Inc., 626 N.E.2d 205 (Ill. 1993), the
Supreme Court of Illinois held that
state law claims for breach of contract
based on an airline's retroactive modification of a frequent flier program
are not preempted by the Federal Airline Deregulation Act, 49 U.S.C. Section 1305(a)(1) (1988), (Deregulation
Act). The court found the plaintiffs'
state law claims for money damages
to be too removed from airline activi-

ties to invoke Section 1305(a)(1),
which prohibits a state from enacting
or enforcing a law relating to the rates,
routes, or services of an air carrier.
Nonetheless, the plaintiffs' attempt to
obtain an injunction to prevent the
airline from retroactively modifying
the rules of the frequent flier program
fell within the constraints of the Deregulation Act and was preempted.
American Offers Frequent Flier
Program
American Airlines offers discounted flights and other travel benefits to customers participating in their
"AAdvantage" frequent flier program.
This marketing device encourages
greater use of American's services by
the general public and by frequent
fliers. Benefits are awarded to participants based upon accumulated
mileage credits, which a member earns
by flying on American or by doing
business with one of American's affiliates.
Prior to May 18, 1988, AAdvantage
members were entitled to redeem their
travel award certificates for free air
travel on any available date and on
any available seat in the class of service provided. As of May 18, 1988,
however, American retroactively altered the terms of its AAdvantage program by instituting various restrictions on previously earned
AAdvantage credits.
Class Action Filed
In response to the changes in the
frequent flier program, plaintiffs, representing AAdvantage members, filed
a class action in the Circuit Court of
Cook County. The complaint alleged
that American's retroactive modification of the rules of the AAdvantage
program constituted a breach of contract with members who joined the
frequent flier program prior to May
1988. The complaint also claimed
violations of the Illinois Consumer
Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act, Ill. Comp. Stat. ch. 815,
para. 505/1 (West 1987), (Consumer
Fraud Act). The plaintiffs, who sought
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